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Oxytocin increases trust in humans
Abstract
Trust pervades human societies. Trust is indispensable in friendship, love, families and organizations,
and plays a key role in economic exchange and politics. In the absence of trust among trading partners,
market transactions break down. In the absence of trust in a country's institutions and leaders, political
legitimacy breaks down. Much recent evidence indicates that trust contributes to economic, political and
social success. Little is known, however, about the biological basis of trust among humans. Here we
show that intranasal administration of oxytocin, a neuropeptide that plays a key role in social attachment
and affiliation in non-human mammals, causes a substantial increase in trust among humans, thereby
greatly increasing the benefits from social interactions. We also show that the effect of oxytocin on trust
is not due to a general increase in the readiness to bear risks. On the contrary, oxytocin specifically
affects an individual's willingness to accept social risks arising through interpersonal interactions. These
results concur with animal research suggesting an essential role for oxytocin as a biological basis of
prosocial approach behaviour.
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Trust pervades human societies1,2. Trust is indispensable in friendship, love, families, 
and organizations and plays a key role in economic exchange and politics3. In the 
absence of trust among trading partners, market transactions break down. In the 
absence of trust in a country’s institutions and leaders, political legitimacy breaks down. 
Much recent evidence indicates that trust contributes to economic, political, and social 
success4,5. Little is known, however, about the biological basis of trust among humans. 
Here we show that the intranasal administration of oxytocin, a neuropeptide that plays a 
key role in social attachment and affiliation in non-human mammals6-8, causes a 
substantial increase in trust among humans, thereby greatly increasing the benefits from 
social interactions. We also show that the effect of oxytocin on trust is not due to a 
general increase in the readiness to bear risks. On the contrary, oxytocin specifically 
affects the individual’s willingness to accept social risks arising in interpersonal 
interactions. These results concur with animal research suggesting an essential role of 
oxytocin as a biological basis of prosocial approach behaviour.  
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The neuropeptide oxytocin (OT) plays a central role in non-human mammals in behavioural 
regulation in general, and in positive social interactions in particular. Aside from its well-
known physiological functions in milk letdown and during labor, OT receptors are distributed 
in various brain regions associated with behavior9,10, including pair bonding, maternal care, 
sexual behaviour and the ability to form normal social attachments6-8,11-15. Thus, OT seems to 
permit animals to overcome their natural avoidance of proximity and thereby facilitates 
approach behaviour. Given the fact that OT appears to promote social attachment and 
affiliation in non-human mammals, we hypothesize that OT might also promote prosocial 
approach behaviour – such as trust – in humans. Recent research has shown that 
neuropeptides cross the blood-brain barrier after intranasal administration16, providing a 
useful method for studying the central nervous effects of OT in humans17. Therefore, we used 
a double–blind study design by comparing trusting behaviour in a group of subjects who 
received a single dose of intranasal OT with that of subjects in a control group that received 
placebo. 
We analyse the impact of exogenously administered OT on individuals’ decisions in a 
trust game with real monetary stakes18-21. In the trust game, two subjects interacting 
anonymously play either the role of an investor or a trustee (Figure 1). The investor first has 
the chance of choosing a costly trusting action by giving money to the trustee. If the investor 
transfers money, the total amount available for distribution between the two players increases 
but, initially, the trustee reaps the whole increase. Then the trustee is informed about the 
investor’s transfer and can honour the investor’s trust by sharing the monetary increase 
generated by the investor’s transfer. Thus, if the investor gives money to the trustee and the 
latter shares the proceeds of the transfer, both players end up with a higher monetary payoff. 
However, the trustee also has the option of violating the investor’s trust. Since sharing the 
proceeds is costly for the trustee, a selfish trustee will never honour the investor’s trust 
because the investor and the trustee interact only once in the experiment.  
Therefore, the investor is caught in a dilemma because if he trusts and the trustee shares, 
the investor increases his payoff; he is also subject to the risk, however, that the trustee will 
abuse his trust. In this latter case, the investor is worse off than if he had not trusted at all and, 
adding insult to injury, the trustee has an unfair payoff advantage relative to the investor. 
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Substantial evidence exists showing that humans are averse to such risks21-23. Moreover, 
investors’ aversion to trust abuse seems to play an important role across different human 
cultures in the context of our game21,24. Therefore, the investors have to overcome their 
aversion against these risks in order to trust, raising the key question whether OT modulates 
this trusting behaviour in humans.  
Our hypothesis that OT increases investors’ trusting behaviour implies that the 
investors in the OT group (N = 29) will exhibit higher transfers than those in the placebo 
group (N = 29). Our data in fact show that OT increases investors’ trust considerably. In 
particular, 13 out of the 29 subjects (45%) in the OT group exhibited the maximal trust level, 
whereas only 6 of the 29 subjects (21%) in the placebo group showed maximal trust (Figure 
2a). In contrast, only 21% of the subjects in the OT group exhibit a trust level below 8 MUs 
whereas 45% of the subjects in the control group show such low levels of trust. These 
differences in the distribution of trust result in higher average and median trust levels for 
subjects given OT (Table 1). The investors’ average transfer is 17% higher in the OT group 
(Mann-Whitney test, z = -1.897, p = .029, one-sided); the median transfer in the OT group is 
10 MUs, whereas the median for subjects with the placebo is only 8 MUs.  
In the trust game, the investor’s risk is due to the uncertainty of the trustee’s behaviour, 
i.e., a social interaction with a specific trustee constitutes the risk. This raises the question 
whether OT helps humans overcome a general aversion against risks or whether OT 
specifically affects trusting behaviour in social interactions. In order to answer this question, 
we conducted a risk experiment in which the investor faced the same choices as in the trust 
game but where a random mechanism and not a trustee’s decision determined the investor’s 
risk. The random mechanism in the risk experiment replicated the trustees’ decisions in the 
trust experiment. Therefore, the investors faced exactly the same risk as in the trust 
experiment (see Methods); however, their transfer decisions were not embedded in a social 
interaction because there were no trustees in the risk experiment.  
The investors’ behaviour in the risk experiment does not differ across the OT and the 
placebo group (Table 1 and Figure 2b). The median transfer is 8 and the average transfer is 
7.5 in both groups (Mann-Whitney test, z = 0.022, p = .983, two-sided, N = 31 in OT group, N 
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= 30 in placebo group). Moreover, there is no significant difference in the comparison of the 
placebo group in the trust experiment with the OT and the placebo group in the risk 
experiment (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2 = 0.533, df = 2, p = .766), with identical median transfers 
across groups (Table 1). However, if we add the OT group in the trust experiment to these 
three samples, significant differences are observed (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2 = 8.610, df = 3, p 
= .035) indicating that only the investors in the OT group of the trust experiment behave 
differently. Thus, OT increases the investors’ transfer levels in the trust experiment but not in 
the risk experiment. This finding is illustrated by a comparison of Figures 2a and 2b which 
shows that only 10 percent of the subjects with OT choose the maximal transfer level in the 
risk experiment whereas 45 percent choose the maximal level in the trust experiment. 
Therefore, the differences between the OT group in the trust experiment and the OT group in 
the risk experiment are highly significant (Mann-Whitney test, z = -2.563, p = .010, two-
sided) suggesting that OT specifically affects trust in interpersonal interactions.  
The risk experiment constitutes a powerful control for the effects of OT on trusting 
behaviour because everything is kept constant relative to the trust experiment except that the 
investors’ risk in the risk experiment is not generated in a social interaction. In particular, all 
the indirect effects of OT on a subjects’ state, such as possible effects on subjects’ mood or 
calmness, would be present in both the trust and the risk experiment. Therefore, these 
potential indirect effects of OT cannot be responsible for the effect of OT on trusting 
behaviour. Moreover, in order to provide an additional control for non-specific effects that 
might be associated with OT administration, we explicitly measured mood and calmness 
before substance administration and 50 minutes afterwards, i.e., before subjects played the 
trust or the risk game. We used a particularly suitable questionnaire for repeated measures 
within short periods of time, one which is widely used in neuropharmacological studies in 
humans25 and correlates with physiological measures26. Statistical differences in the levels of 
mood and calmness before and after the administration of OT are neither observed in the trust 
nor in the risk experiment (Trust experiment: z = -1.541, p = 0.123 for calmness; z = 1.452, p 
= 0.146 for mood; N = 29. Risk experiment: z = 0.620, p = 0.535 for calmness; z = -0.841, p = 
0.400 for mood; N = 31; Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided). This provides further support 
for our previous conclusion that the impact of OT on human trust is not caused by non-
specific psychotropic effects of OT. 
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Which mechanisms might be involved in the effect of OT on trusting behaviour? One 
possibility is that OT causes a general increase in the investors’ prosocial inclinations which 
implies that it should not only affect the investors’ prosocial behaviour but also that of the 
trustees. Therefore, those trustees who are given OT should make higher back transfers at a 
given transfer level than the trustees who received placebo. However, trustees given OT do 
not exhibit more trustworthy behaviour (Figure 3); at every positive transfer level, i.e., at 4, 8 
or 12 MUs, their back transfers are statistically indistinguishable from those of placebo 
trustees (Mann Whitney tests, p > .243, two-sided, for each positive transfer level). Thus, OT 
does not increase the general inclination to behave prosocially. Rather, OT specifically affects 
investors’ trusting behaviour.  
We hypothesize that the differing impact of OT on investors’ and trustees’ behaviour 
is related to the fact that investors and trustees face rather different situations. In particular, 
investors have to make the first step; they have to “approach” the trustee by transferring 
money. In contrast, the trustees can condition their behaviour on the investors’ actions. Thus, 
the psychology of trust is important for investors whereas the psychology of strong 
reciprocity27 is relevant for trustees. The fact that OT affects subjects’ approach or trust 
behaviour but not their degree of reciprocity is in line with the animal literature. There is 
substantial evidence that OT promotes prosocial approach behaviour by inhibiting defensive 
behaviours6,13,14 but there is no evidence that OT affects reciprocity in animals. 
A second mechanism behind OT’s effect on trust could be based on subjects’ beliefs. 
Perhaps OT rendered subjects more optimistic about the likelihood of a good outcome. In 
order to examine this question, we measured the investor’s subjective expectation about the 
trustee’s back transfer after every transfer decision. A Mann-Whitney test indicates that these 
expectations do not differ significantly between groups for every feasible positive transfer 
level (p > .357, two-sided, at given transfer levels of 4, 8 or 12 MUs). Thus, the investors with 
OT exhibit more trusting behaviour but do not hold significantly different beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness. Moreover, OT also does not affect investors’ beliefs about the 
likelihood of a good outcome in the risk experiment (p > .128, two-sided, Mann Whitney tests 
for transfer levels of 4, 8 and 12).  
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Finally, there is the possibility that OT helped subjects to overcome their betrayal 
aversion in social interactions. This explanation is consistent with the differing impact of OT 
across the trust and the risk experiment and it is further supported by the fact that investors 
faced a considerable betrayal risk: an increase in the transfer level from 4 or 8 MUs to 12 
MUs decreased the investor’s average payoff slightly, whereas it increased the objective risk 
of very low back transfers by the trustee. However, betrayal aversion alone cannot explain 
why investors with OT make higher transfers in the trust compared to the risk experiment 
because in the risk experiment betrayal is impossible. The higher transfers in the trust 
experiment can be reconciled with betrayal aversion if one acknowledges that investors’ 
behaviour in the trust experiment is also likely to be driven by the motive to increase the 
available amount for distribution between the two players28. As this motive cannot operate in 
the risk experiment it can only increase transfers levels in the trust experiment. Our 
interpretation of OT’s effect on trust in terms of betrayal aversion may be seen in the light of 
animal studies indicating that an increased central nervous availability of OT facilitates 
approach behaviour by linking the overcoming of social avoidance with the activation of brain 
circuits implicated in reward (e.g., nucleus accumbens)12,15.  
The ubiquity of trusting behaviour is perhaps one of the distinguishing features of the 
human species. An element of trust characterizes almost all human social interactions. Here 
we have sought to examine the impact of OT on trust in humans. Research in non-human 
mammals suggests that OT plays a key role in social attachment and affiliation. We find that 
intranasal administration of OT causes a substantial increase in trusting behaviour. Subjects 
given OT seem to be better able to overcome trust obstacles such as betrayal aversion. Of 
course, this finding may be misused to induce trusting behaviours that selfish actors can 
subsequently exploit. However, our finding may have positive clinical implications for 
patients with mental disorders that are associated with social dysfunctions (e.g., social phobia 
or autism). Social phobia, in particular, ranks as the third most common mental health 
disorder and is characterized by marked social deficits including persistent fear and avoidance 
of social interactions. Thus, our results may indicate fertile areas of research on the role of OT 
in several mental health disorders with major public health significance. 
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Methods 
Subjects 
A total of 194 healthy male students (mean age ± SD: 22.0 ± 3.4 years) from different 
Universities in Zurich participated in the study. 128 subjects participated in the trust, 66 in the 
risk experiment. Exclusion criteria for participation were significant medical or psychiatric 
illness, medication, smoking more than 15 cigarettes per day, and drug or alcohol abuse. 
Subjects were instructed to abstain from food and drink (other than water) for 2 hours and 
from alcohol, smoking, and caffeine for 24 hours before the experiment. Participants were 
informed at the time of recruitment that the experiment would evaluate the effects of a 
hormone on decision making. In total, sixteen of the original sample of 194 individuals were 
excluded because of incorrect substance administration (7 in the trust experiment, 5 in the risk 
experiment) or their stated disbelief that the opponent in the trust game was actually a human 
being (4 participants). The study protocol was approved by the ethics committee of the 
University of Zurich. All subjects gave written, informed consent prior to participation. 
Substance administration 
Subjects received a single dose of 24 IU OT (Syntocinon-Spray, Novartis, Basel, Switzerland; 
3 puffs per nostril, each with 4 IU OT) intranasally or placebo 50 minutes before the start of 
the trust game or the risk experiment, respectively. Subjects were randomly assigned to the 
OT or placebo group (double-blind, placebo-controlled study design). In order to avoid any 
subjective substance effects other than those caused by OT (e.g., olfactory effects), the 
placebo contained all inactive ingredients except for the neuropeptide.  
Behavioural experiment and questionnaires 
After substance administration, subjects completed questionnaires on a computer to measure 
demographic items and psychological characteristics. Due to the crucial role of the social 
environment in triggering behavioural effects of OT as shown in animal research13,29, subjects 
were subsequently asked to wait in the rest area while the next part of the experiment was 
prepared. During this 5 minute waiting period, subjects were seated at different tables. 
Subjects at the same table could talk to each other; however at the beginning of the 
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subsequent experiment they were informed that they will not interact with those subjects who 
sat at the same table. When subjects re-entered the laboratory in both experiments, they 
received written instructions (available from the authors on request) explaining the payoff 
structure of the experiment and the private payment procedure at the end of the experiment. 
Subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned to the role of investor or trustee in the 
trust experiment and did not know the identity of the persons with whom they were matched. 
After subjects had read the instructions in each experiment, we checked whether they had 
understood the payoff structure by means of several hypothetical examples. All subjects (with 
one exception) answered the control questions correctly. One subject did not answer the 
control questions correctly and was excluded from the data set (this subject also did not apply 
the substance correctly). In addition, subjects received an oral summary of the instructions. 
Each subject in the trust experiment made four decisions in the same player role while paired 
with different randomly selected interaction partners. No pair of subjects interacted twice. 
Subjects in the role of the investor received no feedback about the trustee’s decision between 
the different interactions. Each investor was asked about his belief with regard to the expected 
back transfer from the trustee after every transfer decision. It is noteworthy that trust levels 
are statistically constant across the four decisions. There is neither a time trend in investors’ 
decisions in the OT nor in the placebo group. In the risk experiment, everything was identical 
to the trust experiment, except that all subjects were in the role of an investor who could 
transfer 0, 4, 8, or 12 MUs into a project rather than to a trustee. In particular, an investor’s 
payoff risk (i.e., the distribution of payoffs) in the risk experiment was identical to that in the 
trust experiment for any feasible transfer level.  
To measure alterations in subjects’ psychological state throughout the course of the 
experiment, we assessed subjects’ mood and calmness at the beginning of the experiment (i.e., 
before substance administration) and immediately before the trust game or the risk 
experiment, respectively, by means of a particularly suitable questionnaire25. All decisions in 
the experiments and the answers to the questionnaires were entered on a computer using z-
Tree software30. Subjects received a flat fee of 80 Swiss Francs (CHF) for participation in the 
experiment; each MU earned in the trust and the risk experiment was worth CHF 0.40.  
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Table 1. Investors’ average and median transfer behaviour (MUs) 
 Trust experiment  Risk experiment 
 Oxytocin 
group 
Placebo 
group 
 Oxytocin 
group 
Placebo 
group 
Mean average 
transfer 9.6 8.1  7.5 7.5 
Median average 
transfer 10 8  8 8 
Standard deviation 
of transfers 2.8 3.1  3.3 3.4 
Number of 
observations 29 29  31 30 
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Figure 1  The trust game. Both subjects receive an initial endowment of 12 monetary 
units (MUs). The investor can opt for trust by sending 0, 4, 8, or 12 MUs to the trustee. The 
experimenter triples each MU the investor transfers. After the investor’s decision is made, the 
trustee is informed about the investor’s transfer. Then the trustee has the option of sending 
any amount between zero and his total amount available back to the investor. For example, if 
the investor has sent 12 MUs, the trustee possesses 48 MUs (12 own endowment + 36 
tripled transfer) and can, therefore, choose any back transfer between 0 and 48 MUs. The 
experimenter does not triple the back transfer. The investor’s final payoff corresponds to his 
initial endowment minus the transfer to the trustee plus the back transfer from the trustee. 
The trustee’s final payoff is given by his initial endowment plus the tripled transfer of the 
investor minus the back transfer to the investor. At the end of the experiment, the earned 
MUs are exchanged into real money according to a publicly announced exchange rate (see 
Methods). 
Figure 2  Transfers in the trust and the risk experiment. Each observation represents the 
average of an investor’s transfers over four transfer decisions. a. Relative frequency of 
investors’ average transfers across OT and placebo condition in the trust experiment (N = 
58). Subjects with OT exhibit significantly higher transfers. b. Relative frequency of investors’ 
average transfers across OT and placebo condition in the risk experiment (N = 61). Subjects 
in the OT and the placebo group exhibit statistically identical transfer levels. 
Figure 3  Trustees’ average back transfer for different levels of investors’ transfers in the 
OT and the placebo group. The dotted line shows the level of the back transfer necessary to 
achieve payoff equality between the investor and the trustee. The broken line shows the level 
of the back transfer equal to the investor’s transfer to the trustee. The trustees’ back 
transfers are on average slightly higher than the amount sent by the investor. Trustees of 
both substance groups make higher back transfers for higher transfer levels of the investors. 
However, there is no statistically significant difference in back transfers between the OT and 
the placebo group. 
 14
 
 
 
 
Kosfeld_fig1 
2004-09-24446A 
 
12 24 360 0 0 48 
4 8 12 0 
0 
Transfer 
(MUs) 
Back 
transfer 
(MUs) 
Investor 
Trustee Trustee Trustee Trustee 
 15
 
 
 
Kosfeld_fig2 
2004-09-24446A 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Individual investor's average transfer (MUs)
Risk experiment
R
el
at
iv
e 
fre
qu
en
cy
Placebo group Oxytocin group
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Individual investor's average transfer (MUs)
Trust experiment
R
el
at
iv
e 
fre
qu
en
cy
Placebo group Oxytocin group
b 
a 
 16
 
 
 
Kosfeld_fig3 
2004-09-24446A 
 
 
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
0 4 8 12
Investor's transfer (MUs) to the trustee
Av
er
ag
e 
ba
ck
 tr
an
sf
er
 (M
U
s)
 o
f t
he
 tr
us
te
e
Placebo group
Oxytocin group
back transfer = transfer
payoff equality
